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Abstract—We propose a lightweight, and temporally and spa-
tially aware user behaviour modelling technique for sensor-based
authentication. Operating in the background, our data driven
technique compares current behaviour with a user profile. If the
behaviour deviates sufficiently from the established norm, actions
such as explicit authentication can be triggered. To support a
quick and lightweight deployment, our solution automatically
switches from training mode to deployment mode when the user’s
behaviour is sufficiently learned. Furthermore, it allows the device
to automatically determine a suitable detection threshold. We
use our model to investigate practical aspects of sensor-based
authentication by applying it to three publicly available data sets,
computing expected times for training duration and behaviour
drift. We also test our model with scenarios involving an attacker
with varying knowledge and capabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets are rapidly
becoming our digital identity. They are used for payments and
authentication, and they store valuable information. Today’s
mobile device hardware is quite capable with multi-core gi-
gahertz processors, and gigabytes of memory and solid-state
storage. Their relatively low cost, ease of use and ‘always
on’ connectivity provides a suitable platform for many day-
to-day tasks involving money and sensitive data, which in
turn makes mobile devices an attractive attack target (e.g., see
attacks against well-known Apple iOS and Google Android
platforms [1]).
Authentication based on user behaviour and biometrics
has attracted interest as mobile device popularity grows. For
traditional authentication methods, research shows that PIN
and password-based security is cumbersome to use [2], [3], [4]
and is frequently disabled by users. A recent study [5] shows
that 64% of users do not use authentication on their phones.
By contrast, implicit authentication relies not on what the user
knows but is based upon user behaviour, and is accomplished
by building so-called user profiles from various sensor data
[3], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. If the user behaviour is consistent
with their profile, the device will have high comfort, hence no
explicit authentication action is required. However, if the user
deviates sufficiently from the established normal behaviour,
alternative measures can be triggered, such as requiring a PIN
or password. Reducing the occurence of explicit authentication
should provide a more usable experience, and might encourage
more users to protect access to their devices.
Generally, previous work has ignored the practical con-
siderations of deploying implicit authentication in large scale,
in-the-wild deployment scenarios. In this work, we provide
a data driven and empirical study of implicit authentication
under a realistic scenario. In this case, we assume that the user
purchases a mobile device with behaviour learning capabilities
and starts using the device in the same way that they would
any other just-purchased mobile device. The device starts in
‘training mode’, learning the user’s routine until it determines
automatically, from data-driven heuristics that it is time to
switch to deployment. When the model is built and training
ends, the device is considered to be in ‘deployment mode’
in which it presents authentication challenges when a user
deviates from the established normal behaviour. Our research
sought to answer the question of whether we could build
and deploy such a model in a practical and secure manner
on today’s mobile devices, in support of which this paper
contributes the following:
1) We propose an incremental training paradigm that is
transparent to the user. In training mode, the device
updates the profile daily. When the device learns a
user’s routine sufficiently, it automatically switches
from training to deployment mode.
2) After training, the device automatically determines
a suitable detection threshold, below which explicit
authentication is invoked. As the user interacts with
the device day after day, the threshold is dynamically
updated from the observed data.
3) In recognition of changes in work patterns, travel
to new locations and moving to a new place, we
present case studies where behavioural drift occurs
and examine different retraining techniques.
4) We also present an attack analysis, based upon an
adversary with varying knowledge and capabilities.
Our incremental training differs from the previous work [3],
[11], [12] which uses a fixed subset of data (i.e. a percentage of
collected data, typically over a few weeks, is used for training).
We do not disagree that a few weeks may suffice for training, in
fact, we empirically confirm it. We however argue that training
duration must be set automatically on a per user basis since,
as our evaluation shows, there is no one-size-fits-all.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Related
mobile device sensing work is discussed in Section II. The
datasets used in our experiments are detailed in Section III.
Our methodology for building user profiles is introduced in
Section IV, including our incremental training approach and
automatic threshold generation. Section V provides the results,
including our analysis of behavioural drift and our attack
scenarios. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Building profiles from mobile device sensors has a broad
range of possible applications, for example, to facilitate social
studies of human behaviour [6], [13], [14], publicly available
data collections [15], [16] and context aware devices [17], [3],
[11], [8], [9], which is the focus of this work.
Similar to our work, Gupta et al. [17] proposed a model
for the familiarity and safety of a user’s device based upon
its location, and used this to automatically construct access
control policies. Their model distinguishes the behaviour of
different users, and incorporates user feedback for refinement,
though they do not consider the duration of training or the
transition from a training to deployment or retraining. Shi
et al. [3] focused on implicit authentication by learning user
behaviour and assigning a score – positive for familiar events
and negative for novel – based on recent user activity. The
training was performed on a fixed subset (60%) of the data.
Lin et al. [7] proposed a non-intrusive authentication method
based on orientation sensor data using k-nearest neighbour
classification. They argued that while input from a single
sensor may yield poor accuracy, combining multiple sensor
inputs would improve the accuracy. To this end, Senguard [18]
aimed to implicitly and continuously authenticate users using
input from many sensors yielding a stronger classifier built
from per-sensor classifiers.
Furthermore, context aware authentication research [4], [8],
[9], [10] focused on sensing the context in which the device is
used (such as home or work) and providing access based on
device comfort computed from various sensor data. Though a
location-only may be more susceptible to insider attacks (e.g.,
friends and family), something that we address in our attack
model. Eagle et al. [6] employed Eigenbehaviour analysis to
identify the patterns in a user’s daily routine. Using MIT
Reality Mining Data [15], a small set of characteristic vectors
are computed, summarising user behaviour. Various research
[3], [11], [12] proposed an implicit authentication method
using behavioural and environmental biometrics collected from
device sensors. While this context-aware, sensor-based authen-
tication research is similar to our work, the do not address
the incremental training and determining detection threshold
automatically from data.
While previous work investigated the use of various mod-
elling methods, very little attention was paid to the practical
considerations of using such methods in large-scale deploy-
ments with minimum intervention. It is reasonable to expect a
(motivated) user to expend some effort in ‘teaching’ the device
by providing feedback but they will quickly grow tired if fre-
quent and labour intensive feedback is required. Additionally,
some users may prefer an on-device modelling technique that
allows them to build and deploy models without their data
ever leaving the device. Thus, in this work, we propose a
lightweight, non-parametric modelling approach that can run
on today’s modern devices and determine when to stop training
and the threshold for detection, both automatically from the
data. It is conceivable to have multiple techniques, some in
the cloud for more intensive but also accurate modelling. Thus
we believe our technique complements the existing work by
providing a scalable alternative that can run on a device.
III. DATASETS
To facilitate our analysis we use the publicly available Rice
and MIT datasets, as well as our own GCU dataset. Table I
summarises the datasets used in our analysis.
A. GCU
The GCU dataset currently consists of a collection from
7 staff and students of Glasgow Caledonian University. The
present data was collected in 2013 from Android devices
and contains sensor data from wifi networks, cell towers,
application use, light and noise levels and device system stats.
The duration of the data varies from 2 weeks to 14 weeks for
different users. Compared to other publicly available datasets
used in this paper, it also contains a detailed diary for each user
which allows for a more informed investigation of anomalies.
The dataset is publicly available in text file format1.
B. Rice Livelab
The Rice Livelab dataset [16] was created from the be-
haviour of 35 users, all students at Rice University or Houston
Community College. The data was collected from iPhone 3GS
devices between 2010 and 2011 and contains sensor data such
as application use, wifi networks, cell towers, GPS readings,
battery usage and accelerometer output. The duration of the
data varies from a few days to less than one year for different
users. The dataset is publicly available in MySQL format.
C. MIT Reality Mining
The MIT Reality Mining dataset [15] contains the be-
haviour data of 100 subjects from various departments of MIT.
The data was collected from Nokia 6600 smartphones between
2004 and 2005 and contains sensor data such as call logs,
bluetooth devices in proximity, cell towers, application usage.
The duration of data collection varies from a few days to
about one year for different users. It is publicly available as a
MATLAB workspace file.
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF THE GCU, RICE AND MIT DATASETS.
COLLECTION YEAR IS PROVIDED IN PARENTHESES.
GCU (2013) Rice (2010) MIT (2004)
Users 7 25 100
Duration 3 weeks 12 months 6 months
Sensors app, wifi, cell, cpu
load, light, noise,
magnetic field, rota-
tion
app, wifi, cell, de-
vice active, call his-
tory, battery, cpu
load
app, bluetooth, cell,
device active, call,
charge
IV. METHODOLOGY
Our profiling technique builds temporal and spatial models
from data in a lightweight and non-parametric way. When
the profile stabilises, training is considered to be complete
and the device switches to a deployment mode. A detection
threshold is computed based on the user’s security settings to
activate explicit authentication when the comfort is below the
threshold.
1Partial data can be accessed at http://www.ittgroup.org/.
A. User profile
Our technique builds user profiles from probability density
functions of sensor data. Time and location from cell towers
are generally present and are used as so-called anchors,
though our model would support other sources such as wifi or
GPS. Each anchor focuses on a specific location or time and
describes the general characteristics for that anchor through
a set of probability density functions for each sensor’s data.
Using the temporal and spatial models described below, the
device can assign a comfort score for each sensor event based
on its frequency of occurrence for that anchor, i.e., location or
time. Scores from temporal and spatial models are aggregated,
similar to [17], to produce the final score. This information
allows the device to detect unusual use whether it is based on
location or time (as detailed in Section V-C).
The time stamps from the cell towers allow for events to be
partitioned, for example into 24 slots for each hour of the day.
The location identifier from the cell tower provides an abstract
label for a user’s whereabouts in contrast to a GPS location
that provides an exact location albeit with higher cost to the
battery life [18]. Figure 1 provides an overview of the user
behaviour model. In the temporal model there are 24 anchors,
one for each hour of the day. On the other hand, the spatial
model may contain as many locations as the user visits2.
Fig. 1. Sample user behaviour profile that consists of temporal and spatial
models. Each location and time-of-day is a set of probability density functions.
The number of sensors per anchor varies since for a
location, or at a particular time, there may not be sufficient
data for that sensor. For example, a location may not have any
wifi networks associated with it or there may be no app use for
a given time. This allows the model to opportunistically build
the probability density functions for only the existing sensors.
Thus, we define the temporal (temp) and spatial (spat) models
as in Equations 1 and 2, where L and T denote location
and time anchors. Each anchor has its own set of sensors
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm} and pdf denotes the probability density
function.
modeltemp = [pdf(s1|T ), pdf(s2|T ), . . . , pdf(sm|T )] (1)
modelspat = [pdf(s1|L), pdf(s2|L). . . . , pdf(sm|L)] (2)
Probability density functions for discrete sensors (e.g., wifi
readings and app usage, where each data belongs to one
category) are built using histograms [19] by maintaining the
occurrence counts for each sensor event (e.g., using Facebook
app at 3pm or checking email at home). Probability density
functions for continuous data (e.g., light levels, cpu usage)
2If a cell tower is not present, the location identifier is set to ‘unknown.’
are built using kernel density estimators (KDEs). KDE [20] is
a non parametric way of computing probability distributions
from continuous data.
Building probability density functions has two distinct
advantages. First, they can be built incrementally from the
streaming data, thus training data does not need to be stored in
memory, unlike k-nearest neighbour classification [7], support
vector machine [9] approaches. Second, they are lightweight
with typical computational complexity of O(n) for discrete data
of n sample points and O(n+m) for continuous data with m
evaluation points and n sample points from the density. Figure
2 provides a short example of a user behaviour profile for a
discrete and continuous set of sensor data. For our studies, a
typical profile contains about 6 to 8 sensors.
Fig. 2. Sample user behaviour profile that consists of temporal and spatial
models for app usage and light readings. Each location and time-of-day is a
set of probability density functions.
Each model focuses on establishing familiarity from differ-
ent perspectives. For example, while the use of an application
may be deemed frequent (hence, familiar) per location, if the
use takes place at an unusual hour, it can be detected as a
temporal anomaly. Similarly, if an application is used at a
usual time but at an unusual location, it can be detected as
a location anomaly. Maintaining multiple models, each with
its own perspective allows us to build comfort levels based
on multiple indicators. The device is more likely to become
uncomfortable if the events are taking place at unusual times
and locations. Similarly, as the device encounters familiar
surroundings and behaviour, it will become more comfortable.
B. Measuring comfort
A user profile consists of temporal and spatial models con-
taining a set of probability density functions. These models are
employed to establish comfort. The comfort – or lack thereof
– is computed over a period of time and can be computed
during training in order to measure profile stability (see Section
IV-C) and during deployment in order to determine whether
the device is comfortable or not (where the latter would trigger
additional authentication actions).
Data from all available sensors are compared against the
temporal and spatial models and each produces its own comfort
score based on its frequency for the given time and location.
If the location is unknown or the sensor data has never been
encountered for that location, comfort is 0. Thus, each sensor
input collected over the given time period provides a comfort
score; note that some sensors may provide more than one input
(e.g., noise and light readings are sampled more than once).
The aggregate comfort score is computed as follows. The
score from each sensor is aggregated into a sensor score first
(Equation 3). It takes n inputs from one sensor and compares
it against the profile models based on the time and location
which defines the anchor Amod.
Scoresen =
∑n
i=1 pdf(seni|Amod)
n
(3)
Second, scores from many sensors for the given time and loca-
tion are aggregated into temporal and spatial scores in Equa-
tion 4, where sen = {app, wifi, light, noise, cpu, call...} as
detailed in Table I for different datasets.
Scoremod =
∑
sen Scoresen
|sen| (4)
Third, the overall aggregated comfort score, which deter-
mines the detection decisions, is computed by aggregating
temporal and spatial scores in Equation 5 where mod =
{temporal, spatial}. The aggregated score includes positive
comfort from temporal and spatial models and a negative time
score scoretime, which is 0 if the previous and current readings
are within 1 minute (sampling rate) interval. It increases to 1
if the readings are more than 60 minutes apart ensuring that
comfort level gradually decreases if the user does not interact
with the device.
Scoreagg =
∑
mod Scoremod
2
− scoretime (5)
This layered aggregation is advantageous: when the comfort
is low, it is possible to determine if it is a temporal or spatial
anomaly. Furthermore, it is also possible to determine which
sensors provided low comfort scores. In our work, all sensors
are given equal weights but this can be adjusted.
While the computed score provides a basis for comfort,
a single event alone does not provide the sufficient level of
granularity for establishing comfort. For example, even if the
application was never used at a given location or hourly,
events leading to the anomalous application use may indicate
familiarity based on connected wifi and cell towers. This way,
if the user is at a familiar location as established by wifi and
cell tower models, an anomalous use of an application will
produce ‘discomfort’ proportionally. Needless to say, if the
available wifi networks are unfamiliar, cell towers indicate an
unknown location and the application use is anomalous, the
device will exhibit the most discomfort.
To this end, comfort is computed over a period of time (we
empirically selected 1 minute intervals for our analysis in Sec-
tion V). Comfort is computed continuously and incrementally
so that scores from events that occurred in the current time
frame are combined to produce the current comfort score.
C. Profile stability: deciding when to deploy
In order to establish a comfort level which can serve as
an authentication scheme, the device needs to ‘learn’ the be-
haviour of the user for a given period of time. Typically, previ-
ous studies used a fraction of the available data for training and
used the rest for testing, e.g., [3], [9]. Conversely, we approach
training from a data driven angle and aim to let the device
decide when the training is ‘sufficient.’ To investigate how the
learning rates change as the device learns the user behaviour,
we measure the profile stability. A profile stabilises when the
majority of the items such as wifi networks, applications, cell
towers in the models remain unchanged between a number of
days. We selected two consecutive days for our analysis. A key
assumption for our implicit authentication solution – as well as
those of other researchers – is that user behaviour does indeed
show some ‘stability’ after several days. To compute stability,
we establish two distance metrics, one based on Levenshtein
distance [21] on discrete probability distribution models and
an Euclidean distance metric that compares the percentile
characteristics of continuous probability distribution models.
For the latter, we rely on the property that the distance between
two curves increases as their difference between percentiles
increase.
The profiles are built incrementally every day and we
compare the current day’s sensors with the previous day’s
profile and assign a distance metric that ranges between 0
and 1. One would expect the distance to decrease as the
models converge and fewer changes are observed between two
consecutive day’s profiles. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the mean
distance between the current and the previous profile for all
users for spatial and temporal models. Plots show the typical
distance per dataset not for a single user. Distance is computed
for each sensor and the global distance compares the models
as a whole.
Distance measures for GCU data in Figures 3(a) and 3(b)
indicate that it takes at least a week for the profiles to stabilise,
i.e., distance between subsequent days to settle. Given that
GCU data is collected over a relatively short duration (two
weeks), we also analysed MIT and Rice data. In both datasets,
we observe that it takes a few weeks for the profiles to
converge. This confirms the rule-of-thumb that previous work
employed by utilising a fraction of the dataset that is typically
a few weeks in duration. However, we argue that for different
users, longer or shorter training durations may be suitable
hence the device should be able to determine when to switch
from training to deployment. Table II shows that profile for
different users converge at different rates. The convergence is
considered (from the empirical analysis detailed in Figures 3(a)
and 3(b)) to take place when distance is below 0.1.
TABLE II. NUMBER OF DAYS IT TAKES FOR PROFILES TO CONVERGE
FOR GCU USERS.
Convergence
(Global)
Convergence
(Temporal)
Convergence
(Spatial)
User 1 9 days 9 days 9 days
User 2 10 days 8 days 10 days
User 3 3 days 9 days 1 days
User 4 9 days 7 days 9 days
User 5 9 days 8 days 14 days
User 6 9 days 5 days 11 days
User 7 6 days 6 days 8 days
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(b) Temporal models
Fig. 3. Comparison of spatial and temporal models between current day and preceding day on GCU dataset. Low distance indicates increased similarity.
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(a) Spatial models
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(b) Temporal models
Fig. 4. Comparison of spatial and temporal models between current day and preceding day on Rice dataset. Low distance indicates increased similarity.
D. Determining a detection threshold
Computing comfort scores as detailed in Section IV-B
allows the device to produce a score at given time intervals,
every 1 minute in this case. As profiles are built incrementally
each day, the previous day’s model is utilised to compare with
the current day for convergence tests as shown in Section
IV-C. The previous day’s profiles can also be used to compute
comfort levels for the current day’s data to explore how device
comfort changes over time. For example, one would expect
the comfort to be low during the initial days since the device
is unfamiliar with the user. As the profile converges and the
training is sufficiently complete, the comfort should increase
and the detection of anomalies now becomes possible. Each
device will establish a comfort level unique to its user. While a
daily average comfort level of 0.5 may be high for some users,
for others (leading more predictable lives) it may be low.
A detection threshold can be defined as a value below
which additional authentication must be performed, e.g., ex-
plicit authentication. We compute thresholds per user in a
data driven fashion. We utilise the previous day’s profile
and compute comfort levels for the current day. The use of
the previous day’s profile allows us to investigate how the
threshold might change during training. Needless to say, when
a device is in deployment, the profile to be used will be
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(b) Temporal models
Fig. 5. Comparison of spatial and temporal models between current day and preceding day on MIT dataset. Low distance indicates increased similarity.
the one that emerges after training. Figure 7 shows how the
comfort value at 2nd percentile changes over time. The values
from each user in the data is averaged. Furthermore, Figure 6
shows comfort values at 2nd percentile for each user, which
we also use for our computations. In all three datasets, the
comfort level increases substantially in the first few weeks.
Given a 1 minute sampling rate, approximately 1440 comfort
scores are computed per day. We compute the comfort level
at 2nd percentile every day for each user. The implication of
2nd percentile is that, as long as the new data follows the
distribution captured by the model, approximately 98% of the
data will be above the threshold and thus will not result in
explicit authentication.
While the value at percentile provides a data-driven way
to set the threshold, the user can select a suitable percentile
for his/her requirements (and one could imagine that this
value is set at default, and perhaps updated by the phone
manufacturer or service provider). For example, if the user
keeps the percentile at 2, he/she should expect explicit au-
thentication to kick in roughly 2% of the time. If this is not
acceptable from a (usability) security standpoint, he/she can
(decrease) increase the percentile to accommodate (less) more
explicit authentication. This will allow user to interact with the
authentication scheme (in the form selecting a point within a
range) without having to set a specific threshold. Though in
reality, the user may only have insight into the usability impact
of setting the threshold. We discuss issues related to security
and impersonation below in Section V-C.
V. EVALUATION
This section presents case studies of legitimate and attack
usage scenarios to investigate how well our implicit authenti-
cation technique might perform in practice.
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Fig. 6. Comfort score at 2nd percentile over time for each user in GCU
dataset.
A. Long term study of comfort
Rice and MIT datasets contain user behaviour over 6
months. Additionally, two users in the GCU dataset collected
data for over 6 months and they were asked to keep detailed
diaries of their daily lives during this long term experiment.
Figure 8 shows the comfort levels devices observe from a user
from each dataset during the long term experiment. Other users
in the datasets exhibit similar properties.
Figure 8 shows that devices establish different comfort
levels for different users. For GCU User 2, the typical comfort
was around 0.5, whereas for the selected MIT and Rice users,
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Fig. 7. Comfort score at 2nd percentile over time. Score is averaged over all users per dataset.
it was closer to 0.2. This is mainly due to two reasons: (i)
each dataset consists of different sets of sensors, which may
provide different comfort levels, and (ii) each user may have
a different level of predictability in their lives. Therefore, it is
crucial to establish comfort level and detection thresholds per
user since there is no one size-fits-all solution.
Another phenomenon observable from Figure 8 is be-
havioural drift. In long-term studies, we observed a slow and
gradual decrease in overall comfort as time passes. After three
weeks of training, GCU User 2’s device encounters comfort
levels above 0.7, which slowly drops down to 0.5 after 6
months. Similarly, Rice User A08 starts out with comfort levels
of 0.5 which drops below 0 after one year. On the other hand,
MIT User 4 encounters comfort levels up to 1.0 which drops to
0.5 in six months. This supports our argument for retraining:
as the device recognises behaviour drift, it should go back
to training mode again until the new behaviour is learned.
Our technique provides a suitable means to detect behaviour
drift by checking the distribution of comfort levels daily and
suggesting to the user to put the device in training mode, if the
distribution varies sufficiently from that previously established,
for a period of time. Needless to say, to prevent devices from
learning malicious behaviour, the transition from deployment
back to training occurs after explicit authentication and only
for a brief period of time, such as a few hours, after which the
user needs to authenticate again to update the model.
Note that we use the term ‘retraining’ since our current
model is based upon a fixed profile that is used during
deployment. Drift from this profile can automatically trigger
periodic retraining. An alternative would be to use a more
dynamic profile that gradually changes according to a user’s
behaviour drift. However, we believe that such a model may
not be as effective since more frequent updates could require
user confirmation, and our goal is to reduce the frequency
of explicit user interaction. In addition, our experimental data
suggests that behavioural drift might not be so noticeable till
after a period of several months (e.g., 6 months for some
users). Thus, the relatively stable behaviour of users over
time suggests that a fixed model, with periodic retraining, is
sufficient for our purposes.
B. Changes in behaviour
The long term study of comfort levels on the three datasets
shown in Figure 8 shows behavioural drift in which the comfort
level decreases over time. This can cause an increase in the
number of explicit authentication requests if the comfort drops
below the detection threshold frequently. Over the period of a
few months, the comfort level drops substantially for all three
users.
To investigate the effect of moving to a new city, we plot
the comfort level observed for GCU User 2 in Figure 9. On
June 15, the user moves to a different city which causes the
comfort level to drop. In Figure 9(a) the device uses the old
model after the move resulting in a low comfort level. Figure
9(b) shows the change in comfort level when the user choses
to update the existing model whereas in Figure 9(c), the old
model is scrapped and a new model is trained. Results show
that re-training the existing model 9(b) is comparably effective
as training a new model 9(c) when the established routine
changes, although retraining the existing model appears to
provide higher comfort scores for the first few days.
C. Attack Case Studies
Four different attack scenarios are formulated based on the
attacker’s level of access to a user’s frequent locations and
his/her knowledge about the user’s behaviour [3]. To this end,
we define two adversarial levels based on their knowledge
of the user and the authentication scheme. An uninformed
adversary knows very little about the user and their routine
whereas an informed adversary possesses some knowledge of
the users, for example, applications are frequently used (e.g.,
a close friend or family member). Additionally, we define an
outsider to be a person who steals the device and runs away.
On the other hand, an insider has access to a location that user
frequently visits and attempts to use the device at a location
familiar to the device (e.g., an office mate).
To facilitate our experiments, we asked one of our lab
members to use their device until the profile settled. After the
profile settled, the device owner was asked to use the device
normally to establish the typical comfort level. We then devised
four scenarios, detailed as follows:
(a) GCU User 2 (b) Rice User A08 (c) MIT User 4
Fig. 8. Long term comfort levels for sample users from each dataset. Other users exhibit similar properties.
(a) User moves and does not re-train device. (b) User moves and trains model incrementally (c) User moves and trains a new model
Fig. 9. The change in comfort level when user moves with and without training.
Uninformed outsider: The attacker took device and car-
ried it with them for one day. The attacker lived in another
city, ensuring that the locations they frequent were different
from the owner’s. The attacker was provided no additional
information on how the owner uses their device. The attack
started at 2pm. This is similar to a typical device theft.
Informed outsider: The attacker took the device and car-
ried it with them for one day. The attacker’s work and home did
not intersect with the device owner’s, ensuring that locations
are different. However, the attacker was provided with a list
of applications that the owner uses. The attack started at 3pm.
This attack corresponds to a device theft scenario where the
attacker tries (albeit with limited sophistication) to evade the
authentication technique.
Uninformed insider: The attacker took the device to a
cafeteria that the device owner goes to for lunch breaks. Thus,
the location was known to the device but was not one of the
frequent locations such as home. The participant attacker was
provided no additional information on how the owner uses
their device. The attacker used the device between 1pm and
5pm. This scenario corresponds to an insider attack in which a
naive insider attempts to use the device at a reasonably known
location.
Informed insider: The attacker, who was the owner’s
housemate, used device at the owner’s home for the day. Thus,
the location was well known to the device. The participant
attacker was provided with additional information on how the
owner uses their device as well. The attacker used the device
between 1pm and 5pm. This scenario corresponds to an insider
attack in which a capable insider attempts to use the device at
a well-known location.
Figure 10 shows the changes in comfort levels for attack
scenarios. The horizontal line shows the detection threshold
and vertical lines indicate the time of the attack. All four at-
tacks caused comfort level to drop considerably, hence setting
off explicit authentication. Informed attacks produce higher
comfort levels compared to uniformed attacks but not enough
to bypass detection.
After deployment, the device automatically determined the
detection threshold to be 0.2. Therefore during the attack
scenarios, if the comfort level drops below 0.2, the device
requires explicit authentication to unlock. Table III provides
a summary of results for the attacks as well as the control
sample day during normal use. Results are provided in terms
of the average comfort, percentage of events that are flagged
as attacks and the time it took for the device to lock down.
The results indicate that uninformed attacks, both outsider
and insider, are detected quicker than the informed attacks.
Additionally during all four attacks, the comfort level dropped
substantially below the owner’s average. With the exception
of informed insider attacks, arguably the most sophisticated of
the four, attacks were detected with over 95% detection rate.
Even when the attacker attempted evasion, the device locked
in under 15 minutes.
Of course, this initial security analysis only demonstrates
the relative difference between our four attack scenarios.
Further study is required with a larger sample of users, and
with different model parameters.
(a) Uninformed Outsider. (b) Informed Outsider.
(c) Uninformed Insider. (d) Informed Insider.
Fig. 10. Comfort levels observed during attacks.
TABLE III. AVERAGE COMFORT LEVEL AND THE RATIO OF EVENTS
THAT ACTIVATED EXPLICIT AUTHENTICATION.
Scenario Comfort (mean) Detection rate Time to detect
Owner’s sample day +0.503 1.01% –
Uninformed outsider -0.038 99.44% 122 sec
Informed outsider +0.074 98.12% 851 sec
Uninformed insider +0.102 95.85% 239 sec
Informed insider +0.196 53.21% 717 sec
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we study the use of sensor-based authen-
tication on mobile devices. To this end, we proposed a
lightweight profiling technique that is based on probability
density functions of sensor data that provide temporal and
spatial awareness. Given that building probability density
functions take near linear time, we believe it is a suitable
method for performing on-device training. The training process
and determination of a suitable threshold is data driven and
automated so as to reduce costly human involvement as much
as is possible.
While our results are derived from our new model, our
broader goal was to begin to quantify the effectiveness of
sensor-based authentication. To this end, it is crucial to es-
tablish the operational advantages and limits of sensor-based
authentication and to build more robust models that account
for slight changes in user behaviour while being able to
rapidly detect truly malicious behavioural changes, all while
not adversely impacting device resources (e.g., battery).
Our future work includes several investigations along these
lines. For example, we are expanding our analysis to incor-
porate various supervised learning techniques for profiling.
We are also investigating the effectiveness of different model
parameters, and of different sensors (perhaps in different
situations or for different users), that might lead to a weighted
comfort computation. Finally, while we used a sampling rate
of 1 minute for our experiments, we are also investigating
the use of adaptive sampling, at least to reduce the battery
consumption of our techniques.
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